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1.  Introduction 
The structures of financial systems vary among industrial and developing countries. In 
some countries, financial systems are predominantly bank-based, while in others they are 
dominated by capital markets. Only fragmented theories exist in the literature that explain the 
prevailing differences in country financial structures, which are defined as the mix of financial 
markets, institutions, instruments, and contracts that prescribe how financial activities are 
organised at a particular date. 
The existing studies explain the prevailing differences in financial structures using legal 
origin and protection, politics, history, and culture as factors. This paper considers the link 
between the real economic structure and the financial system of a country. Such a relationship is 
influenced by the funding sources for corporate investment that differ depending on firm and 
project characteristics (Allen, 1993; Boot and Thakor, 1997; Allen and Gale, 1999). Consistent 
with this theory, banks are more appropriate for the financing of traditional asset-intensive 
industries, whereas capital markets favour innovative and risky projects. One implication of this 
theory is that the real economic structure of a country, whether it is asset intensive or service 
oriented, could determine its financial structure. For instance, financial systems in countries such 
as Germany and Japan would remain bank-based as long as their economies are dominated by 
manufacturing industries. Contrastingly, the financial system in the United States will continue 
to be market-oriented as long as service and highly innovative companies constitute a large share 
of the economy. Consequently, the financial systems of the United States, Germany, or Japan 
will remain at polar extremes because of their economic structures even though the countries are 
at a similar stage of development. 
Robinson (1952) argues that financial intermediaries and markets emerge when required by 
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industries. Consequently, intermediaries and markets appear in response to economic structure. 
The idea that the form of financing, and thus the country's financial structure, depends on the 
type of activity that firms engage in has not yet been directly addressed in the literature. To 
provide evidence of the hypothesis that structure and changes in the real economy determine the 
direction of evolution of a country's financial system, we first must distinguish the different 
financial structures across countries. However, although recent attention has shifted to a more 
systematic classification of financial systems, the literature provides only very broad measures 
and definitions for classification. Consistent with the literature this study classifies a country's 
financial system as either bank-based (the German or Japanese model) or market-based (the 
Anglo-Saxon model). In the bank-based financial system, financial intermediaries play an 
important role by mobilising savings, allocating credit, and facilitating the hedging, pooling, and 
pricing of risks. In the market-based financial system, capital markets are the main channels of 
finance in the economy (Allen and Gale, 2000). 
Our theory builds on Rajan and Zingales (2003a) who note that bank-based systems tend to 
have a comparative advantage in financing fixed-asset-intensive firms rather than high 
technology research and development-based firms. Rajan and Zingales (2003a) argue that fixed-
asset-intensive firms are typically more traditional and well understood, and the borrower has the 
collateral to entice fresh lenders if the existing ones prove overly demanding. As per Rajan and 
Zingales (2003a), loans are well collateralised by physical assets, and therefore are liquid; hence, 
the concentration of information in the system will not be a barrier to the financing of these 
assets. Conversely, the authors argue that market-based systems will have a comparative 
advantage in financing knowledge industries with intangible assets. 
Consequently, we suggest that countries with a majority of physical-asset-intensive firms, 
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depending on external finance, will be more likely to possess a bank-oriented financial system. 
However, capital markets should develop more effectively in countries with firms that are based 
on knowledge and intangible assets. We test this hypothesis by identifying fixed-asset-intensive 
firms within the economic sector defined as industry by the standard classification system for 
economic activity. Conversely, in this study the service sector acts as a proxy for knowledge and 
intangible asset firms. The relative importance of the two types of firms in an economy will be 
represented by the relative volume of activity of the two different economic sectors. The 
standard system of classification for economic activity includes a third sector, agriculture. We 
classify agriculture as a physical-asset-intensive industry because land and agricultural 
machinery may be used as collateral and, therefore, we assume that firms in the agricultural 
sector will prefer bank financing over capital markets. 
We first present some historical evidence showing the nexus between real economic 
structure and financial system. In order to test our outlined hypothesis, we use a panel data set 
for 108 countries and employ both the panel OLS and a two-step generalised-method-of-
moments (GMM) system. Additionally, we investigate the robustness of the results by 
introducing different additional control variables and testing the heterogenous effects. The results 
suggest that there is a negative and significant relationship between a country’s economic 
structure (industry versus service sector) and financial system structure (stock market versus 
banking sector). In economies where the service sector carries more weight economically than 
industry and agriculture, the country tends to have a market-based financial system. In contrast, a 
bank-based financial system is more likely to emerge in economies with many fixed-asset-
intensive firms.  
Next, we conduct event studies using the treatment effect estimation to isolate the 
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endogeneity concerns. We analyse different types of exogenous shock to the structure of the real 
economy and its impact on financial structure. We employ three events that changed the 
economic structures of the countries and further investigate their impact on the financial 
structure using a difference-in-difference strategy. The first event is India’s structural reforms in 
1991 as a positive shock to the country’s economy; the second one is the demise of the Soviet 
Union as a negative shock to the economy of Finland and Sweden; the third one is the economic 
reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s in South Korea. In India and South Korea we find that after 
the structural reforms of the economies, the service sector grew in relative terms and the stock 
markets in both countries experienced significantly faster growth than their banking systems, 
compared to the control countries. In Finland and Sweden we document that following the 
negative shock the service sector gained in relative importance, which was followed by the faster 
growth of the equity market in comparison to the banking system. Overall, the results of the three 
different event studies confirm our hypothesis that the relative importance of financial 
intermediaries and markets is determined by the industry needs of a country. 
The findings of this study are interesting from a regulatory perspective and lend insight 
into the development of financial structures worldwide. The main policy implications from this 
study are that financial structures should be evaluated in terms of whether they meet the 
requirements of the real economy and industries. Furthermore the financial structure cannot be 
changed as long as the economic structure does not change. The results provide insight into the 
reasons for limited capital markets growth in developing countries despite official stimulation 
efforts from governments and multilateral organisations (Schmukler et al., 2007). According to 
our study of many developing countries, as long as economies remain relatively agriculture- and 
industry-oriented, any government effort to create or further develop a capital market is likely to 
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not to be very successful. Additionally, any regulation that attempts to force a change in the 
financial system may result in a discrepancy in the economic and financial structure. Therefore, 
such efforts or regulations may introduce financial constraints that can further stall economic 
growth because financial structure influences output levels and economic growth (Levine and 
Zervos, 1998; Luintel et al., 2008). 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a short review of the literature on 
economic and financial structures. Section 3 presents some historical evidence on the nexus 
between economic structure and financial structure. Section 4 describes the data and the 
descriptive statistics. Section 5 introduces the econometric methodology, and Section 6 presents 
the main results as well as the event studies. Section 7 describes the industrial-level evidence. 
Finally, Section 8 provides concluding remarks. 
2. The real economy and finance nexus 
A number of explanations for financial structure exist in the literature; however, none are 
able to provide a comprehensive account of the observations. The first explanation is based on 
legal origin and investor protection. Levine (1997) builds on the work of La Porta, Lopes-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998; henceforth LLSV) stating that legal systems originate 
from a limited number of legal traditions: English common law or French, German, and 
Scandinavian civil law. In his study on financial development and economic growth, the author 
employs measures of creditors' rights and demonstrates that they may explain the emergence of 
bank-based financial systems. Modigliani and Perotti (2000) argue that legal institutions 
determine the degree of financial development and the financial structure of a country. They 
argue that market-based systems flourish in environments with strong institutions. Ergungor 
(2004) also attempts to explain differences in financial structure by examining legal origin across 
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countries. His study presents evidence that countries with civil law financial systems are more 
likely to be bank-oriented than common law countries. In the author’s opinion, this evolution is a 
result of effective rule of law in common law countries, which improves shareholder and creditor 
rights protection. A perspective has emerged in the literature that legal origin can be used to 
explain the structure of a financial system.  
However, Rajan and Zingales (2003a) argue that countries with a common law system did 
not rely on markets to a greater extent than civil law systems at the beginning of the last century. 
They report that in 1913, the ratio of France's stock market capitalisation to GDP was twice as 
high as that of the United States, which is a country that has an environment that favours capital 
market development according to the legal origin perspective. It is therefore problematic to argue 
that legal origin is the main determinant of financial structure. The view presented below is that 
both the structure of the financial system and the laws will adapt to the needs and demands of the 
economy. One example of this is branching regulation in the United States banking sector. Rajan 
and Zingales (2004) note that as technology improved the ability of banks to lend and borrow 
from customers at a distance, competition increased in the United States even when banks had no 
in-state branches. Politicians who could not prevent this competition because they lacked 
jurisdiction, withdrew the regulations that limited branching. Another example is the removal of 
the Glass-Steagall Act, which had restricted banking activities in the United States since 1933. In 
this case, the introduction of the Financial Modernisation Act in 1999 followed the creation of 
the first financial holding company in the United States and removed past restrictions. Therefore, 
we argue that economic demand may enhance the evolution of the financial structures and of the 
legal system. 
The existing empirical results show also that legal investor protection may support 
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financial development. For example, LLSV (1997) show that countries with poorer investor 
protection have less developed capital markets. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2004) find that 
countries with stronger protection for shareholder rights tend to have a more market-based 
financial system. Djankov et al. (2007) investigate cross-country determinants of private credit 
and find that legal creditor rights are statistically significant and quantitatively important in 
determining private credit development, while there is no evidence showing that creditor rights 
are converging among legal origins. Moreover, Djankov et al. (2007) confirm that shareholder 
protection is positively related to stock market development. 
The second explanation for financial structure is based on political factors. Biais and 
Perotti (2002) provide a theoretical model of government incentives to structure privatisation 
policy so that financial shareholders are diffused, which may be designed to ensure re-election. 
Additionally, Perotti and Volpin (2004) argue that established firms have an incentive to limit 
entry by retarding financial development, which may well impact the financial structure. Perotti 
and von Thadden (2006) use a theoretical model to demonstrate the effect of the distribution of 
income and wealth in democratic societies and their influence on the financial structure of an 
economy. 
Moreover, according to Rajan and Zingales (2003a, 2004) structures of the financial 
system are unstable and evolve over time. They argue that a financial system will develop toward 
the optimal structure but will be hindered by politics, which are often influenced by powerful, 
incumbent groups. Similarly, Cull and Xu (2013) argue that financial development is driven by 
political economy. In their opinion financial development may reflect the interests of the elite, 
rather than providing broad-based access to financial services. Song and Thakor (2012) develop 
a theory of how a financial system is influenced by political intervention that is designed to 
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expand credit availability. They show that the relationship between political intervention and 
financial system development is nonmonotonic. In the early stage of financial development, the 
size of markets is relatively small and politicians intervene by controlling some banks and 
providing capital subsidies, while in the advanced stage when the financial sector is most 
developed, political intervention returns in the form of direct-lending regulation.  
A third explanation is that historical factors may influence the existing shape and 
development of the financial system. Monnet and Quintin (2005) argue that the legal differences 
in countries with bank-based and market-based financial systems are fading as a result of 
government efforts to deregulate and liberate financial systems in the last few decades. However, 
institutional convergence has not implied financial convergence across countries. The argument 
is based on the assumption that the historical fundamentals of financial systems are relevant and 
any change in structure is costly. Thus, the authors claim that the past structure of a financial 
system explains and determines the existing structure. Torre et al. (2013) argue that financial 
development paths are found to be strongly dependent on initial level of per capita income. 
Furthermore, the regular dynamics that financial development followed can be largely explained 
by the underlying frictions that hinder financial contracting. The structure of the financial system 
and its evolution over time reflect efforts to find the path of least resistance around these frictions. 
Another perspective is presented by Stulz and Williamson (2003) who argue that culture 
matters for financial development since it affects the costs per capita, development of institutions 
and how resources are allocated in an economy. They use religion as a proxy for culture and 
show that a country's principal religion predicts the cross-sectional variation in creditor rights 
better than the origin of its legal system. They report that creditor rights are stronger in countries 
where the main religion is Protestant rather than Catholic, which may also explain why Catholic 
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countries have a less developed banking system and debt market. In line with this, Kwok and 
Tadesse (2006) argue that national culture may be an important determinant of a country's 
financial structure and present evidence that countries characterised by higher uncertainty 
avoidance (risk aversion) are more likely to have a bank-based system. On the other hand, Beck 
et al. (2003) do not find a robust, and consistent relationship between a country's principal 
religion and financial development. Thus, the existing results on the relationship between 
financial development and religion are ambiguous. 
This variety of approaches suggest that there is no consensus with respect to the 
determinants of financial system structure. We suggest that specialisation patterns in a financial 
system are influenced by the composition of the economy, which in turn is determined by a 
country's endowments. In our view, the financial structure may adapt to the needs of the 
economy as has been reported by economic historians such as Gerschenkron (1962), Tilly 
(1967), and Chandler (1977). 
Allen (1993) and Allen and Gale (1999, 2000) use a theoretical framework to argue that 
markets are superior at funding new innovations with uncertain outcomes, whereas banks are 
superior at providing additional funding for existing, more mature enterprises. In Allen and 
Gale's (1999) model, individual investors agree to disagree on the feasibility of new projects with 
uncertain returns. In a financial system where each investor makes an individual decision with 
respect to an investment, more innovative but risky projects are funded compared to a financial 
system where the investment decision is delegated to a bank manager. Consequently, the 
authors’ framework would indicate that markets are more likely to finance innovative industry. 
However, the existing empirical work is less conclusive concerning the impact of the 
financial structure on economic or industry growth. For example, Beck et al. (2000) and Beck 
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and Levine (2002) show that the overall level of financial development and legal system 
efficiency exert a significant and economically large effect on economic growth; however, there 
is no cross-country empirical support for similar effects on financial structure. However, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2004) concede that the result of economic performance being 
impervious to financial structure does not necessarily imply that institutional structure is of no 
consequence to industry and economic growth. Instead, it may simply indicate that either there is 
no optimal institutional structure that fits every situation at all times, or the indicators used in the 
literature may not satisfactorily capture the roles of banks and markets. The findings have been 
confirmed also by Tadesse (2002) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2012). Beck et al. (2013) explore 
the relationship between the size of different financial institutions and their impact on firms’ 
access to financial services. They show that dominance of banks in most developing and 
emerging countries is associated with lower use of financial services. On the other hand, larger 
banks may actually ease financing constraints of small firms in low-income countries. 
Carlin and Mayer (2003) investigate the relationship between institutional and financial 
structures with industry characteristics in a cross-sectional setting. They find that the differences 
in financial structure impacted the real economy by affecting the growth and investment 
decisions of various industries. The industries that were heavily dependent on equity financing 
were found to grow more rapidly in countries with a market-based financial system. 
Additionally, they find that the financial structure has an impact on industrial growth and on 
R&D investment. Those findings are consistent with Binh et al. (2006). Rioja and Valev (2011) 
do not confirm that the financial structure affects economic growth; however, they find that a 
bank-based financial system is associated with stronger physical capital accumulation. Lin, Sun 
and Jiang (2009) propose that a financial structure is optimal for a country at some stage of 
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economic development only when the financial structure matches the industrial structure (See 
also, Lin, 2012). Luintel et al. (2008) show that the complete absence of cross-country support 
for a financial structure reported by certain panel or cross-section studies may be a result of 
inadequate accounting for cross-country heterogeneity. 
The current study differs from the existing literature on financial structure and economic 
growth. Instead of examining the relationship between growth and finance, we concentrate only 
on the nexus between economic structure and financial structure. However, in providing 
evidence that the economic structure determines financial structure, we provide support for the 
existing research, which has documented that financial structure is relevant to industry and 
economic growth. 
3. Historical evidence 
The literature investigating the structural changes in the economy links them to different 
factors. Smith (1776) argues that the main dynamic impulse to changes comes from the division 
of labour. The labour specialization was associated with productivity gains and innovation, 
resulting in changes in the composition of economic activity and the evolution of a new structure 
of the economy. Schumpeter (1928) claims that innovation is a major force that led to changes in 
the economic structure. In recent years a number of studies attempted to provide a general 
conception of the structural changes in the economy when taking into account the influence of 
technological changes explicitly (Silvia and Teixeira, 2008). 
The literature underlines that technological changes are often the main cause of structural 
changes in the economy in the last decades (Hansen and Prescott, 1993). The profound changes 
in the economy due to the advantage of science and technology reflects the employment in the 
sectors (Gali, 1999). In the last two centuries employment shifted from agriculture to 
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manufacturing, while in recent years it is shifting to services. The major technological innovation 
stimulates the expansion of new industries and economic growth, while the importance of 
industries with older technologies declines. An illustration of the process of structural changes 
are Kondratieff long waves. Kondratieff (1979) proposes that the economy develops in long and 
short economic cycles. The long waves have an average length of roughly 50 years, while the 
short business cycles range from 7 to 11 years, which generally cover an upswing and a 
downswing. Kondratieff detected two and half such waves from 1790 to 1917, the first cycle of 
which coincided with the invention of the steam engine that changed textile production. The 
second cycle was associated with the development of the railroad, and the third cycle was caused 
by electricity. The fourth cycle after the World War II, was possibly triggered by the widespread 
usage of oil and cars. The contemporary cycle, which is numbered as the fifth, is caused by IT 
technology. 
The contribution of Schumpeter (1939) to Kondratieff cycles theory was the 
identification of innovations as the main trigger for structural economic changes. Apart from the 
Kondratieff cycles he distinguished a long (Kuznets), intermediate (Junglars) and short waves 
(Kitchin) of about 18, 8 and 4 years in duration, respectively. The first wave, led to growth of 
coalfields and factory towns in north and west of Britain. As a result the share of labour in 
agriculture started to decline from 37% in 1801 to 10% in 1911, whereas in the years 1500-1801 
the share of labour employed in agriculture was higher and it ranged from 40% to 75% (Allen, 
2000). The decline of labour in agriculture prior to the Industrial Revolution is related to the 
Agriculture Revolution in Britain, which occurred in three waves in the years 1520-1850 (Allen, 
1999). 
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Using the US as an example, Table 1 shows the employment changes across industries 
over the last century (1910 vs. 2015). In 1910 almost one third of the employees worked on 
farms, which later further declined to 27% in 1920, compared to less than 1% in 2015. In 
manufacturing, employment also decreased from 22% in 1910 to less than 9% in 2015. A decline 
in employment can also be observed in the industries of forestry, mining, construction or 
transportation. On one hand, domestic service, such as maids and cooks in private households, 
accounted for over 4% percent of employment in 1910.
1
 On the other hand, today’s economy 
includes professional services, related to computers and electronics that did not exist a century 
ago. The professional services industry accounted for almost 29% of employment in 2015. 
Moreover, employment in the wholesale and retail trade industry increased from just over 9% in 
1910 to almost 23% in 2015. An increase in employment could also be observed in finance and 
real estate or educational services over the century (Leon, 2016). Indeed, the data on 
employment points to a strong shift in the employment from manufacturing toward service 
industries over the last century. 
[TABLE 1] 
The literature on economic history often associates the Agriculture and Industrial 
Revolution with the financial revolution and the development of the modern financial system. 
For example, Schumpeter (1939) argues that services provided by financial intermediaries and 
markets are essential for technological innovation and economic development. Similarly, Dobb 
(1960) and Sen (1960) underline the need for directing investment resources toward expanding 
the capacity of basic sectors. Indeed, the first cycle – the Industrial Revolution and the following 
waves are associated with the vast expansion of financial intermediaries as a result of the 
                                                          
1
 This sector does not exist anymore.  
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demand of entrepreneurs in new industries, whereas in the first years the investments were 
largely financed by industrialists (Fohlin, 2012). With the formation of the central banks, which 
stabilized the monetary system, the countries’ nationwide banking system started to appear. 
These banks contributed to and partly resulted from industrialization, whereas many of them 
were founded by industrialists. In most of the European continental countries, a group of large 
banks emerged that pioneered universal banking by providing both debt and equity financing to 
the new emerging industries. In those countries’ banks often remained the dominant financial 
intermediary in the economy. 
By the late 17
th
 century, organized securities markets began to develop in essentially all 
industrialized economies. In the following years, several large trading companies especially in 
France and England, issued shares that were traded in non-organized stock markets. The 
bankruptcy of one of them – the Mississippi Company – resulted in the creation of the first 
organized stock exchange in France in 1724. By the end of the 19
th
 century, trading of securities 
in organized exchanges was common in the industrialized nations of Europe and its colonies, the 
US, and Japan. 
In the beginning of the 20
th
 century all the industrial countries had a relatively well 
developed and diversified financial system, which consisted of a banking system and securities 
markets. Dimson et al. (2002) show that the ongoing structural changes in the economy were 
accompanied by changes in the composition of listed companies. Table 2 presents the industrial 
composition of listed companies in the US and the UK in the beginning of 1900 and 2000. In 
1899 the railroad companies accounted for 50% and 63% of stock market value in the UK and 
US, respectively. A century later, railroads declined and represented close to zero in the majority 
of industrialized countries. Moreover, the stocks of many industries such as textiles, iron and 
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coal have declined as well (Dimson et al., 2002). On the other hand, there are still some 
similarities today between 1990 and 2017. The service industry, represented by banking and 
insurance industries was present in a significant way in 1900 and is present today. Another 
feature that stands out is the high share of companies from industries that did not exist in 1900. 
Among these companies, technology, oil, gas, telecommunication, media and healthcare are the 
largest industries in 2017, and together they represent 62% and 47% of the market in the US and 
UK, respectively (Dimson et al., 2016, 2017). 
[TABLE 2] 
The changes in the composition of companies listed in the stock markets reflect a wave of 
transformative innovation starting from the Agriculture and Industrial Revolution. As shown 
above the newly emerging industries led to changes in the composition of the economic 
structure. A large body of literature presented strong evidence that the capital accumulation was 
associated with an increase in the volume of financial intermediation (Goldsmith, 1969; Atje and 
Jovanovic, 1993; King and Levine, 1993). Most of the existing studies, however, do not 
distinguish between the two different financial structures – market- and bank-oriented financial 
systems, which emerged over the last century. Our aim is to fill this gap by investigating the 
development of the two different systems. 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
4.1 Sample 
Our sample consists of a panel of observations for 108 industrial and developing countries 
over the sample period 1972 to 2015. We use the revised financial structure database of Beck et 
al. (2001, 2010, 2012, 2013) to construct the financial structure indicators and update the missing 
information with the data from Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2004). The data for economic 
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structure are from the World Bank WDI database. 
We average data over non-overlapping, five-year periods and provide nine observations 
per country when available. The first period is from 1972 to 1976, the second period is from 
1977 to 1981, and so on. The last period is from 2012 to 2015 with only four years, due to data 
availability. Table A.2 in the Appendix presents the average value of the relevant factors 
concerning the financial, economic, and institutional structure of the countries in our sample. 
We also control for systemic banking crises because they may influence the structure of the 
financial system (Allen et al., 2012). We follow the definition of a systemic banking crisis by 
Laeven and Valencia (2012), which documents a systemic banking problem as a crisis when a 
country’s corporate and financial sector experience a substantial number of defaults. However, 
because the alterations in economic fundamentals in successive periods are typically minor, it is 
not easy to provide an exact definition and differentiation of a banking crisis. This paper uses the 
initial date of systemic banking crises provided by Laeven and Valencia (2012); therefore, 147 
banking crises around the world during 1972 to 2011 are considered in the analysis. 
4.2 Variable definition 
Our hypothesis is that countries with a predominance of tangible-asset-intensive industries 
are more likely to exhibit a bank-based financial system. However, economies with a strong 
service sector are more likely to exhibit a market-based financial system. To test the hypothesis, 
we require appropriate indicators for the financial structure and the structure of the real 
economy. 
We follow Beck and Levine (2002) and Levine (2002) to construct the measures for the 
financial system structure. The main indicator for financial structure (Structure) is the first 
principal component of two variables that measure the comparative Size and Activity of markets 
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and banks. The first variable Size equals the log of the ratio of market capitalisation to private 
credit. Market capitalisation is defined as the market value of listed shares divided by GDP and 
is a measure of the size of stock markets relative to the economy. Private credit represents the 
value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP. It is a broader 
measure of financial intermediation because it includes all the financial institutions, such as 
deposit money banks, but excludes credit issued by the monetary authority. The second measure 
Activity equals the log of the ratio of value traded to private credit. Value traded equals the value 
of stock transactions as a share of national output. It is frequently used as an indicator of stock 
market liquidity. It is an important measure because stock market size and liquidity are entirely 
different issues. Stock markets could be sizable because of a substantial number of listings but 
may be illiquid or shallow because of a lack of active trading. 
For robustness we also use an alternative aggregation of the financial structure variable 
called Aggregate. The variable is a principal component of the three variables: Size, Activity, and 
Efficiency. The last variable measures the relative efficiency of a country's stock markets 
compared to that of its banks, calculated by the total value traded in the stock market over the 
overhead costs in the banking system. Higher values of the financial structure measures indicate 
more market-based financial systems.  
The main regressor, the one that we are checking for correlation with financial structure, is 
an indicator of the significance of the industrial sector in the real economy. Our main claim is 
that the predominance of the industrial sector, represented in this study by tangible-asset-
intensive firms, will induce a financial system to be bank-based, as opposed to a service-oriented 
economic structure that will lead to a market-based financial system. We use, therefore, a ratio 
that has an indicator of the industrial sector as the numerator and a variable for the service sector 
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as the denominator. Higher values of this indicator suggest that the industrial sector (fixed-asset-
intensive firms) plays a more significant role in a given economy than the service sector (firms 
based on knowledge and intangible assets). To divide the real economy into the two different 
industries, we use gross value added for the three main economic sectors: Agriculture, Industry, 
and Service. Agriculture is defined as the value of gross value added generated by agriculture, 
hunting, forestry, and fishing as a percentage of GDP. Industry is defined as the value of gross 
value added generated from mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and gas. 
Service is defined as the gross value added generated from the wholesale and retail trade, hotels 
and restaurants, transport, government, financial, professional, and personal services such as 
education, health care, and real estate services. Because land, agriculture, and machines may be 
used as collateral, we classify Agriculture together with Industry as an asset-intensive sector, 
whereas we use the Service sector as a proxy for firms based on knowledge and intangible assets. 
We measure the real Economic Structure (ES) by combining the three variables in two 
different ways. The first variable ES1 equals Agriculture and Industry to total gross value added. 
It is a measure of the importance of the asset-intensive sectors in the economy. For the second 
measure, we decided not to employ Agriculture because sector development in certain developed 
countries may depend on state subsidies and transfers rather than on funds raised through the 
financial system. Hence, this sector may to a lesser extent influence the shape of a country's 
financial structure. Therefore, we construct our second measure ES2 by dividing Industry by 
Service only. This variable reflects the importance of the asset-intensive industry with respect to 
knowledge and intangible asset sectors. 
The changes in gross value added, and therefore the proxies, can provide unclear 
information concerning a country's economic structure. In the majority of countries, the share of 
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industry value added has been declining in recent decades. However, an increasing share of 
service gross value added does not necessarily mean that economies are becoming more service-
oriented. In recent years, many changes in economic structures have been a result of service 
activity outsourcing. These service activities were previously carried out internally by industrial 
enterprises, for example, the marketing activities of an industrial sector firm. In this case, the 
salaries of the employees form part of the gross value added recorded for the industrial sector. If 
the industrial firm outsources the marketing activities and subsequently purchases them from a 
specialist producer, the salaries of the employees will now be part of the gross value added of the 
service sector. Consequently, there will appear to have been a decline in the share of industry and 
a rise in the share of the services sector although there may have been no changes in the quantity 
of services actually produced. We assume that such factors affect all of the countries in the 
sample and should not significantly alter the results of this study. 
The literature provides some evidence that other factors may determine the structure of a 
country’s financial system. We therefore augment the baseline regressions with various 
institutional variables to assess the robustness of our results when controlling for the additional 
determinants of the financial structure proposed by the existing literature. Those determinants are 
legal origin, legal protection, political, historical, and cultural factors. 
We follow LLSV (1998) and identify the legal origin of each country's company or 
commercial law as French, German, Scandinavian, British, or Socialist. Because all the former 
socialist countries in our sample have reverted to their prior legal system, we follow Harper and 
McNulty (2008) and replace the Socialist legal origin with Russian legal origin. The dummy 
variable L_Russia equals one if the former socialist country company/commercial law has 
Russian legal origin and zero otherwise. The dummy includes many former socialist countries; 
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however, it should be emphasised that not all of them had Russian legal origin. The majority of 
the countries moved either to German or French legal origin, which they adhered to prior to 
communism. The dummy for French civil law (L_French), German civil law (L_German), and 
British common law (L_British) legal origin are constructed in an identical manner as the 
Russian legal origin dummy, whereas the Scandinavian legal origin (L_Scandinavian) is 
captured in the regressions as the reference level. Based on the existing evidence, we expect to 
observe a negative correlation between the dummy for the French, German, and Russian civil 
law legal origin and the financial structure indicators. Conversely, we expect a positive 
relationship between our financial structure measures and the dummy for the British common 
law legal origin. 
The political view holds that civil and common law differ in their emphasis on the rights of 
private property compared to the rights of the State. To account for the possibility that the legal 
system influences the structure of the financial system through the political channel, we include a 
common law dummy, which is an alternative legal variable. The dummy Common Law takes the 
value one for common law countries and zero otherwise. 
LLSV (1998) argue that stock markets tend to be underdeveloped in civil law countries 
compared to common law countries. Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that banks are 
predominant in countries with an ineffective legal system and where contract enforcement is 
lacking because the banks are able to enforce contracts through market power. Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine (1999) show that countries with more legal protection to minority shareholders tend 
to have a market-oriented financial system. Additionally, Claessens and Laeven (2003) show that 
weaker legal frameworks diminish the availability of external resources and show an assets 
substitution effect, which is the investment in more fixed assets relative to intangible assets 
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compared to firms operating in a strong legal environment because of weaker (intellectual) 
property rights. Because common law provides more protection to minority shareholders, we 
expect a positive relationship between the common law dummy and the financial structure 
variables. 
We follow Djankov et al. (2007) and Spamann (2010) to identify creditor protection and 
shareholder protection at the country level, respectively. Creditor rights are an ex-post 
mechanism that protects creditors upon default. Djankov et al. (2007) construct creditor rights 
index based on LLSV(1997) and expanded their sample from 49 to 133 countries. The creditor 
rights (CR) index, which ranges from zero (weak) to four (strong), measures the power of 
secured lenders in bankruptcy from four aspects which include creditors' consent for 
reorganization, no automatic stay to seize collateral, secured creditors paid first and management 
out. In the meanwhile we also control for shareholder protection, using use the anti-director 
rights (ADR) index. The original ADR index of LLSV (1998) aggregates six dimensions of 
shareholder protection rules. Among the six components, three are concerned with shareholder 
voting, including voting by mail, voting without blocking shares and calling an extraordinary 
meeting; the others are concerned with minority protection, including proportional board 
representation, preemptive rights and judicial remedies. Pagano and Volpin (2005), however, 
criticize the ADR index for its ad hoc nature and mistakes in coding. In response, Djankov et al. 
(2008) provide a revised ADR index, which was better theoretically grounded and more reliably 
weighted for 72 countries. Spamann (2010) further improves the index involving leading local 
lawyers and provided a corrected ADR index for forty-six countries, which is used in this study. 
Monnet and Quintin (2005) use a theoretical model to demonstrate that financial structure 
differences can persist between two economies even when their fundamental characteristics have 
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converged. This implies that changes in a financial structure are costly and are an explanation as 
to why financial systems still differ across countries. The main implication from the model is that 
the history of a financial structure is required for an understanding of its current structure. 
We therefore must take into account the past fundamentals of financial structure. We 
control for the past structure by employing variables representing the historical size (H-size), 
activity (H-activity), and structure (H-structure) of the financial system, which have been 
calculated using the data from the year 1972 to 1976. However, we are not able to calculate the 
historical financial structure for all the countries because of missing data and limited time series. 
Moreover, we do not have historical variables for efficiency or aggregate variables because the 
data on overhead costs required for the calculations was available only from the year 1980. 
Finally, we introduce a religion variable into the model to measure culture as a potential 
explanation of diversity in the financial structures. Consistent with Beck et al. (2003) and 
Djankov et al. (2007), we use the religion, practiced by the largest proportion of the population 
to examine the potential impact of culture. Existing literature argues that religion shapes people’s 
views on property rights, competition and the role of the government (Stulz and Williamson, 
2003). For example, both Landes (1998) and Beck et al. (2003) argue that Catholic and Muslim 
countries tend to have xenophobic culture and both church and governments maintain control 
which limits competition and private property rights protection. Our religion index identifies four 
categories of religion, Catholic, Muslim, Protestant and other religions. The Protestant religion is 
captured in the regressions as a constant hence it is omitted. All the definitions and sources of the 
main variables are listed in Table A.1 in the Appendix.  
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables used in the 
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regression analysis. The results indicate a large variation in financial and economic structures 
across the sample countries. 
The variable Structure exhibits high cross-sectional variability ranging from -3.67 to 2.88 
with a mean value of 0.02. The variable Aggregate also shows a large variation, ranging from -
3.21 to 2.01 with a mean value of 0.02. The variable Structure identifies Armenia, Guatemala, 
and Uruguay as the countries with the most bank-based financial systems in our sample. 
Conversely, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Zimbabwe are classified as economies with the most 
market-based financial systems in the sample. When the variable financial aggregate is used, 
Switzerland, instead of Zimbabwe, is classified as the country with the most market-based 
financial systems in our sample, followed by Zimbabwe, Finland as well as the United States, 
whereas Armenia, Guatemala, and Uruguay are still classified as the economies with the most 
bank-based financial systems. The variables ES1 and ES2 also display considerable cross-country 
variation. The first real economic indicator classifies Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, and Oman as 
tangible-asset-intensive economies, whereas Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Barbados, and the 
United States are classified as intangible-asset-intensive economies. In the case of Barbados, the 
result is driven by the importance of single sectors, that is, the development of the tourism sector 
in their economy. In the case of Panama, the economy is primarily based on the tourism, trade, 
and transit sectors, whereas for Barbados the outcome is mainly driven by the development of 
the tourism sector. For these countries, overall the service sectors account for over three-quarters 
of GDP on average during our sample period. When we exclude the agriculture sector and 
compute the second measure for economic structure, the countries Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi 
Arabia are classified as the countries with the most tangible-asset-intensive economies in our 
sample. Conversely, Hong Kong, Luxembourg and Barbados are classified as intangible asset-
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based economies, followed by Greece and the United States. As a result of the exclusion of the 
agriculture sector, we are able to observe certain changes in the classification of economies as 
asset intensive, whereas the classification of intangible-asset-intensive economies remains almost 
unchanged. On average, economies tend to be more based on the service sector than on the 
agriculture and industry sectors. Among industrialised countries, the size of the agriculture and 
industrial sector with respect to that of the service sector ranges from 23% in the United States to 
65% in China. 
The statistics in Table 3 show that each of the financial structure indicators is negatively 
correlated with the two indicators of the real economic structure; however, such association is 
more significant for our main economic structure indicator, confirming our assumption with 
respect to the existing relationship between financial and economic structures. Additionally, as 
shown in other studies, there is a strong positive correlation between financial structure and 
British law, whereas the relationship between financial structure and the French and Russian 
Law implies the opposite. The results are consistent with the existing studies that demonstrate a 
positive relationship between common law and capital market development. Moreover, 
consistent with the literature, shareholder protection shows a strong positive and significant 
relationship with the relative growth of capital markets to banking sector. Creditor protection, 
however, shows no statistical significant association with countries’ financial structure. The 
impact of the historical financial structure is also significant on the current structure of financial 
system. In addition, the results show that Catholic countries tend to have more bank-based 
financial systems, while Muslim countries tend to have the opposite. For the other religions 
excluding the Protestant, the correlation tends to be quite mixed. Consistent with Stulz and 
Willamson (2003), we also find that the Catholic countries protect the rights of creditors less 
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well.  
[TABLE 3] 
5. Methodology 
We use different regression models in the study to assess the impact of economic structure 
on financial structure. First, we use a panel OLS model to test whether economic structure 
determines financial structure with the following basic model: 
 
                                                                    (1) 
where, yi,t represents one of the five measures for Financial Structure, ES is one of the two 
economic structure indicators, X is a set of additional explanatory variables including legal origin, 
legal protection, history as well as religion, t,i is the error term, and i and t denote country and 
time period, respectively. 
Panel OLS with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors allows us to correct for errors 
that are both heteroscedastic and contemporaneously correlated within countries, whereas it does 
not control for endogeneity, which may cause simultaneity bias. To address this problem, we use 
the two-step generalised method of moments (GMM), a dynamic panel procedure developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and implemented by Blundell and Bond 
(1998) as a second step to test the relationship between financial and economic structures. The 
regression equations have the following form: 
tititititi XESy ,
2
,1,,                                       (2) 
where yi,t represents one of the five measures for Financial Structure, ES is one of the two 
economic structure indicators, and X is a set of contemporaneous explanatory variables. In the 
regression,   captures unobserved country-specific effects,    is a time-specific effect, t,i  is a 
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time-varying error term, and i and t represent the country and time period respectively.  
The consistency of the system GMM estimator depends on the validity of the instruments 
and the validity of the assumption that the error terms do not exhibit serial correlation. We use 
the specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), 
Blundell and Bond (1998), and more recently by Roodman (2009) to test our specifications. The 
first is the Hansen J specifications test, which tests the validity of the instruments. The second 
test examines the hypothesis that the error term εi,t is not serially correlated. We test whether the 
differenced error term is second-order serially correlated because, by construction, the 
differenced error term is likely to be first-order serially correlated even if the original error term 
is not. A failure to reject the null hypotheses of both specification tests provides support to our 
model. 
In order to further identify the causal relation between economic structure and financial 
structure, we conduct event studies and employ the structural reforms in India in 1991, the 
demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the economic reforms in South Korea in the 1980s and 
early 1990s as different shocks to the structure of the real economy. We employ a difference-in-
difference strategy by introducing an interaction term of the variables Shock and Treated to 
examine how such a change in economic structure causes the change in financial structure. We 
use the following identification as the regression model: 
      
                   
          
                                  (3) 
where the Shock represents the exogenous shock to the structure of the real economy; and 
Treated is defined as one for the treated countries, and zero for the control countries.    captures 
unobserved country-specific effects,    is a year-specific effect, t,i  is a time-varying error term, 
and i and t represent the country and year. Instead of using five-year average panel dataset, we 
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use the yearly panel dataset for the event studies. 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Baseline results 
In this section, we present the baseline results on the association between economic 
structure and financial structure. We use five measures of financial structure characteristics as 
the dependent variable respectively, and two economic structure indicators as the main 
explanatory variables. Table 4 reports the results.  In Panel A, we use panel OLS regressions 
with country fixed effects to control for the country-level heterogeneities. In Panel B, we employ 
the two-step system GMM method. The results show consistently that the variables for economic 
structure are negatively and significantly associated with financial structure. The negative sign 
implies that an increase in the size of the service sector with respect to the industry and 
agriculture sector would lead to an increase in the significance of the stock market in the 
financial system. Moreover, the interpretation of the coefficients suggests that a change in the 
economic structure will have a greater impact on the activity and efficiency of the financial 
sector and, to a lesser extent, on its size.  
When the second variable for economic structure is employed, the results are less 
statistically significant. The coefficient for economic structure remains negative and is 
significant in a majority of the specifications. Only when the dependent variable is the aggregate 
measure for financial structure is the coefficient for economic structure insignificant. One 
interpretation for the weaker results could be that in using the second variable we exclude 
agriculture, which is an important sector of the economy in certain countries and may have a 
significant impact on a country’s financial structure.  
[TABLE 4] 
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The findings confirm that the structure of an economy exerts an influence on the direction 
of the evolution of the financial system. Countries with asset-intensive industries tend to have a 
bank-based financial system. Conversely, market-based financial systems are more likely to 
evolve in countries where the service sector represents a large part of the economy. Hence, a 
shift in the economy from industry toward service may be associated with a change in the 
financial structure. Moreover, the coefficients on economic structure in the regressions imply a 
substantial impact on all aspects of the financial structure. If a country's economic structure 
moves toward intangible asset-intensive industries, it would potentially increase first the liquidity 
and efficiency of the capital market and then its size. However, all these interpretations must be 
accepted with caution. In practice, we expect that development of the service sector would 
increase the need to finance through capital markets, which would result in the expansion of the 
market. However, change in financial structure is a long-term process that may not immediately 
follow a shift in the economic structure. 
6.2 Robustness check and discussion 
We then investigate the robustness of our results and control for other variables, suggested 
in the literature, that may also influence a country's financial structure. We group these controls 
into four categories according to the different perspectives on the financial structure determinants 
outlined in Section 2. We still employ the five measures of financial structure as the dependent 
variable respectively. However, for brevity we only report the results using Structure, which is 
the principal component of Size and Activity. 
Table 5 presents the results. Overall, the addition of control variables does not change the 
main results. The coefficients of the economic structure remain negative and highly significant in 
all the specifications. In column (1) and (2). We only introduce the dummy for the legal origin of 
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common law so the civil law dummy is captured as a constant in the regressions. The results 
show that on average common law countries have significantly more market-based financial 
systems than civil law countries do, consistent with the existing literature. In column (3) and (4), 
instead of only controlling for the common law origin, we also control for the French, German, 
and Russian legal origins. The coefficients for the French, German, and Russian legal origin 
enter negatively into the regressions. However, the coefficients for those legal origins show a 
weaker relation to the financial structure indicators. Only the coefficients for German and 
Russian legal origin are negative and significant when we employ the second measure of 
economic structure which excludes agriculture from consideration. Generally, we find relatively 
weak evidence of the impact of civil law legal origins on financial structure. Moreover, we 
assume that Russian legal origin is more significant only because it reflects the ongoing changes 
in the corporate governance and accounting standards in the former socialist countries for the last 
two decades. Those reforms and changes in the economic structure resulted in the rapid 
development of capital markets in those countries, which we assume is captured to some extent 
by the legal dummy. 
[TABLE 5] 
In column (5) to (8) we extend these analyses by controlling for investor protections 
instead of legal origins. Incorporating the controls for the possible influences by creditor and 
shareholder protection in one country helps to isolate the independent association between 
economic structure and financial structure. We employ both the corrected and the revised 
versions of the anti-director rights index developed by Spamann (2010) and Djankov et al. (2008)  
respectively as a proxy for shareholder rights. The main results still hold, suggesting that if a 
country's economic structure moves to industries with more intangible assets, the capital markets 
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are likely to grow and get more efficient. The coefficients of creditor rights enter negatively but 
insignificantly in all the specifications. In contrast, the coefficients of shareholder rights enter 
positively and statistically significantly in all the specifications, indicating that the improvement 
in shareholder protection is beneficial for capital market development, which is consistent with 
Djankov et al. (2008). 
 In column (9) and (10), we modify the regressions by introducing the historical financial 
structure variables. Using the historical values, we proxy for the past structure of the financial 
system. The results only partially confirm the relationship between the past and present financial 
structure. The coefficients for the past financial structure are positive and significantly related to 
the present financial structure at the 10% level only when we use the second measure of 
economic structure. Consequently, we do not find strong evidence confirming that the past 
financial structure influences the present structure of the financial system. The results indicate 
that great reversals are also possible, consistent with the findings of Rajan and Zingales (2003b). 
Moreover, the coefficients for economic structures remain negative and statistically significant in 
both columns. Consequently, we find that the evolution of the economic structure has an impact 
on the current structure of the financial system rather than its history. 
Finally in column (11) and (12), we further incorporate the dummy variables for religions, 
as a proxy for a country’s national culture, in the regressions. Our results show that religion may 
also affect financial structure. Using Protestant countries as a benchmark, Catholic countries on 
average have more bank-based systems, while Muslim and other religious countries do not seem 
to have a significantly different financial structure with Protestant countries. Consistently with 
Beck et al. (2003), we also find a strong correlation between Catholic religion and French civil 
law legal origin (correlation 0.47 in Table 3), which suggests that it may be particularly difficult 
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to distinguish between Catholic religion and the French civil law tradition. Overall, controlling 
for religious factors does not change our main results, confirming that economic structure is 
significantly negative associated with financial structure.  
6.3 Heterogenous effects 
As discussed in Section 2, some existing studies argue that the finance-growth nexus may 
also depend on the strength of institutional factors including legal and political institutions. For 
example, Beck et al. (2000) emphasize that what matters more for the linkage of finance and 
growth is the efficiency of the legal system in protecting outside investors’ rights. A related 
perspective is the political economy view, arguing that governments play an important role in 
building an effective and inclusive financial system (Demirguc-Kunt, 2012). Consistently, Rajan 
and Zingales (2003b) argue that politicians act in their own interests and do not intervene into the 
financial system to further improve public welfare but to divert the flow of credit to politically 
connected firms (see also, e.g. Becker and Stigler, 1974). Hence, we assume the nexus between 
economic structure and financial structure also depends on the effectiveness of legal and political 
institutions. In other words, we hypothesize that the relationship between economic structure and 
financial structure is stronger in countries with more effective legal or political systems. In order 
to further identify the causal relationship between financial structure and economic structure, we 
then examine the heterogeneous effects by splitting our sample. 
Table 6 presents the results using subsamples of different countries. In column (1) to (4) 
we split our sample into countries with less or more developed legal systems based on the 
median value of the legal enforcement index defined by the days of contract enforcement 
(Djankov et al. 2007); and in column (5) to (8) we split our sample into countries with more or 
less effective governments based on the median value of the government effectiveness index 
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(Kaufmann et al., 2010). The results show that in column (3) and (4) the coefficients of 
economic structure are significantly negative whereas those in column (1) and (2) are statistically 
insignificant although also negative. The coefficients of economic structure in column (5) to (8) 
point to a similar pattern. Overall it suggests that the impact of economic structure on financial 
structure is significantly stronger for countries with more developed legal systems or more 
effective governments, supporting our hypotheses. The Chi-sq tests on the coefficients of 
economic structure suggest that the economic impact is significantly more pronounced when we 
apply the second measure of economic structure, which excludes agriculture for analysis.  
[TABLE 6] 
During systemic banking crises and economic recessions, economic structure may evolve 
faster based on the nature of the economy, e.g. whether the economy is service-sector-driven or 
manufacturing-driven. Therefore, we examine whether the economic structure affects financial 
structure in a stronger manner during the recessions. We split the sample and examine the impact 
of economic structure on financial system during normal periods versus systemic crises, with the 
results presented in Table 7. We run the regressions for normal periods in column (1) and (2) and 
for crisis periods in column (3) and (4), and find that, a systemic banking crisis does not change 
the observed relationship between economic and financial structure. Moreover, this relationship 
is more significant and pronounced during crises than during normal periods. The Chi-sq tests on 
the coefficients of economic structure further suggest that the difference is significant. This is 
consistent with existing literature on the change of financial structure during systemic banking 
crises. For example, Allen et al. (2012) find that during the crises the financial structure may 
experience short-term reversal, and can revert back in a few years after the crises. Financial 
crises usually are companied by economic recessions, during which the manufacturing or service 
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sector may decline. Therefore, such effect can come from the short-term change of economic 
structure during crises.  
 [TABLE 7] 
6.4 Event studies 
6.4.1 Structural reforms in the early 1990s in India 
In order to further isolate the potential endogeneity concerns, we conduct event studies 
using a difference-in-difference strategy. We explore the shocks to the structure of the real 
economy and investigate how the financial structure responds to such shocks. 
The first event we employ is the structural reforms and liberalizations in the early 1990s 
in India. Continuous structural reform policies were launched in India in 1980s and 1990s. 
However, Panapariya (2004) documents that the difference between the reforms in 1980s in 
India and those in 1990s is that the former were limited in scope and without a clear road map 
whereas the latter were systematic and systemic. In mid-1991, India’s exchange rate was 
subjected to a severe adjustment, which led to the 1991-92 crisis in India (Cerra and Saxena, 
2002). In response to the crisis, the government obtained assistance from the IMF, followed by 
the domestic structural reforms that they mandated. The so-called post-crisis reform started from 
the “Statement of Industrial Policy” in July 1991, which emphasized accelerating the process of 
industrial and import delicensing, and then shifted to further trade liberalization and tax reform. 
As a result, the economic structure, in terms of the relative importance of manufacturing to 
service sector, started to turn downward in the early 1990s. Afterwards, the service sector in 
India has grown faster than the other sectors, to become the dominant sector in the economy. 
Figure 1 shows the change of economic structure and financial structure in India from 1960 to 
2015. Due to the data limitation of value traded in the stock market before 1978 for India, we use 
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the variables Size to measure financial structure instead of the variable Structure, the principal 
component of Size and Activity, as in previous sections. 
[FIGURE 1] 
Hence, we employ the structural reforms in India in the early 1990s as a shock to the 
economic structure and examine how the financial structure changes before and after such a 
shock in India versus other Asian developing countries.
2
 In the regression Treated_India is 
defined as one for India, and zero for other Asian countries excluding India, South Korea, Japan, 
Singapore and Hong Kong. Shock_India is defined as one from 1993 to 2015, after the launch of 
the reform measures, or zero before 1990. We drop the years of 1991 and 1992 from our 
analyses, considering the crisis and the following announcement of the reform policies in India 
during this period. Figure 2 plots the financial structure (the variable Size) for both treated and 
control countries, showing that the stock market rose in both treated and control countries in 
mid-1980s, while after the policy change the Indian stock market continued to rise relative to its 
banking sector until the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s
3
. 
[FIGURE 2] 
Table 8 Panel A reports the regression results. In the event studies we use the yearly panel 
data instead of the 5-year averaged panel data to capture the yearly change of both economic 
structure and financial structure before and after different shocks. We did not introduce the year 
and country fixed effects in order to report the coefficients of time indicator and the time-
invariant legal and culture variables. Instead, to consider the impact of the macro-economy, we 
include GDP growth as a control variable in all the specifications. In column (1) we incorporated 
                                                          
2
 We exclude Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong for our analysis as these regions have more developed financial 
sectors and real economies.  
3
 There was a correction in the stock market for the control countries in the end of 1980s due to the stock market 
crash in the US in 1987 and its spill-over effect. However the correction lasted for only about two years. 
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the dummy variable, Shock_India, Treated_India and their interaction term. In column (2)-(4) 
we further added the legal and cultural variables into the specifications. The results show that 
overall the stock market is less developed than the banking system in the treated country, India, 
with the Treated_India dummy entering with a strong negative sign. However, the interaction 
enters with a significant and positive sign in all the regressions, indicating that after the structural 
reforms, the stock markets experienced significantly faster growth than the banking systems, 
compared to those in the control countries. Consequently, the findings from the impact of 
structural reforms in India on financial structure confirm the negative causal link between 
economic structure (industry versus service sector) and financial structure (stock market versus 
banking system). 
 [TABLE 8] 
6.4.2 Collapse of the Soviet Union 
The second event we use is the collapse of the Soviet Union, as an exogenous shock to the 
economies of Finland and Sweden. We examine how the financial structure of Finland and 
Sweden responds to such a shock. During 1991 to 1993, both countries experienced economic 
contraction
4
. Gorodnichenko et al. (2012) argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the 
cause of the restructuring of the manufacturing sector and the economic depression in Finland so 
it provides a unique natural experiment for which we know with precision the timing, nature and 
size of the shock that hit the Finnish economy. Finnish manufacturing industries experienced a 
deep contraction due to the exposure to Soviet trade. The shock to the economy triggered a 
systematic banking crisis in 1991 and a currency crisis in 1992, with volatile interest and 
exchange rates (Englund and Vihriälä, 2008). Afterwards, the depression in Finland led to 
                                                          
4
 From 1991 to 1993, the average GDP growth rate of Finland and Sweden is -3.3% and -1.5% respectively.  
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dramatic changes in the Finnish economy, and the rise of Nokia and the telecommunications 
industry, and the corresponding change in economic structure. Due to the close ties between 
Sweden and Finland, the economic structure of Sweden experienced a similar trend, though the 
recession is milder and the causes of the systematic banking crisis are different (Englund and 
Vihriälä, 2008)
5
. In Figure 3 we plot the change of economic structure and financial structure for 
Finland and Sweden from 1974 to 2015. 
[FIGURE 3] 
Hence, we employ the collapse of the Soviet Union as an exogenous shock to the economic 
structure and examine the financial structure before and after such a shock for Finland and 
Sweden versus other countries that were not hit by such a shock but have a similar level of 
economic development. In order to isolate the possible spill-over effect, we exclude Norway and 
Denmark from our analysis. Hence, in the regression Treated_SU is defined as one for Finland 
and Sweden and as zero for other OECD countries excluding Nordic countries. Shock_SU is 
defined as one since 1993 or zero before 1988. In order to isolate the potential impact of the 
movements on trade relationship in those years, we dropped the time period between 1988 and 
1992. Figure 4 plots the financial structure (the variable Structure) for both treated and control 
countries. We find a similar trend of financial structure in the a few years before the shock while 
a deviated trend after the shock, suggesting that the parallel trends assumption is likely to be 
satisfied.  
 [FIGURE 4] 
                                                          
5
 According to the World Bank report “Foreign Trade Statistics in the USSR and Successor States”, the total trade 
volume between Finland and the Soviet Union (export and import) is 3,827 million USD in 1990 and drops to 379 
million USD in 1991. The total trade volume between Sweden and the Soviet Union is 926 million USD in 1990 and 
drops to 98 million USD in 1991. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/172291468752103344/Foreign-trade-
statistics-in-the-USSR-and-successor-states 
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Table 8 Panel B reports the regression results. In column (1) we include only the dummy 
variables Shock_SU, Treated_SU, and the interaction term as well as GDP growth. Similarly to 
the specifications in the example of India, we did not incorporate the country and year fixed 
effects in the regressions. The results show that Treated_SU enters with a negative but 
insignificant sign, suggesting that on average the financial structure of treated countries is not 
significantly different from the control countries. The interaction enters with a significant 
positive sign, showing that after the collapse of Soviet Union, which hit severely the 
manufacturing of the treated countries, the stock markets in the treated countries experienced 
significantly faster growth relative to the banking system than those in the control countries. 
Then in column (2) we further control for the common law legal origin, so the civil law legal 
origin is captured as constant in the regression. In column (3) we control for the investor 
protections and in column (4) we control for the religion respectively. Our results still hold when 
we control for more factors that would possibly affect the financial system structure, suggesting 
a negative casual link between economic structure (agriculture and manufacturing versus 
services) and financial structure (stock market versus banking system). 
6.4.3 Economic Reforms in the 1980s and 1990s in South Korea 
The third example we use is the economic reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s in 
South Korea as a shock to its economic structure.  We also examine how the financial structure 
responds to it. From the 1960s to 1980s, South Korea achieved rapid economic growth at an 
average of more than 8 percent per year. Prior to the 1950s, South Korea had little 
industrialization and a small and underdeveloped stock market, but became a high-income 
country by the 1990s, making it a stellar example of industrial catch-up in the late 20
th
 century. 
Since the mid-1980s, the government started to intervene in heavy industries which led to 
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enormous structural change afterwards in its industrial structure and exports (Chang, 1993). Such 
industrial policy measures included the coordination of complementary investments (the so-
called Big Push), policies to ensure scale economies, as well as the state acting as a venture 
capitalist and incubating high-tech firms in new materials, mechatronics, aerospace etc. (Chang, 
2009). The importance of manufacturing in the economy started to decrease from the end of 
1980s, with the service sector expanding continuously (Figure 5). Figure 6 plots the change of 
financial structure for both the treated and control countries before and after the reform was 
launched. 
Table 8 Panel C reports the regression results using the example of South Korea. The 
specifications are similar with those in the previous event studies. Shock_Korea is defined as one 
from 1995 to 2015, after the launch of reform policies, or zero before 1984. We drop the years 
between 1985 and 1994 from our analyses because of the launch of the policy measures during 
this period. Treated Korea is defined as one for South Korea, or zero for other Asian countries 
excluding Singapore, Japan, India, South Korea and Hong Kong. The results show that overall 
the stock market is less developed in South Korea than in the control countries; however the 
interaction term enters with significant and positive signs in all the specifications, indicating that 
after the shock the stock market in South Korea experienced significantly faster growth than that 
in the control countries. The finding using the example of South Korea points to the same 
prediction that the economic structure (industry versus service sector) negatively affects the 
financial structure (stock market versus banking sector), further confirming our main finding on 
the relations between economic structure and financial structure.  
[FIGURE 5] 
[FIGURE 6] 
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7.  Industrial-level evidence 
To check the robustness of our main results we conduct a wide array of additional 
analyses; however, for brevity we do not report them in full
6
. First, we check the consistency of 
the results after removing outliers. These outliers are eliminated after considering the scatter plot 
of the main financial and economic structure indicators. We eliminate those countries that fall 
particularly far from the regression line and then repeat the estimation on the new sample. After 
eliminating the extreme observations, we still find a significant and negative relationship 
between economic and financial structure. Second, we increase the set of explanatory variables 
and add variables for country GDP, inflation, area, latitude, dummies for landlocked economies, 
transition economies, or developing countries. Including these variables does not affect either the 
significance level or the sign of the estimated coefficients. Third, we divide the countries in the 
sample into two groups based on their membership in the OECD. We assume that countries 
belonging to the OECD are on average more developed than non-OECD member countries. 
Using the two separate samples we compute again the baseline regressions. The results indicate 
that the relationship between financial structure and economic structure is much stronger in 
industrial countries than in developing countries. One possible explanation for this result is the 
different development stage of the financial system itself. In developing countries, the financial 
structure is emerging and adjusting to the needs of the real economy at the same time. Moreover, 
rapid changes in the financial structure are often caused by additional factors such as 
liberalisation or political transformation. Conversely, in most of the industrial countries, we may 
assume that the financial system may already have an optimal structure, whereas changes are 
only caused in case of significant changes in the economic structure, which takes substantial 
                                                          
6
These robustness results are available in full on request. 
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time. 
Fourth, in the case of the OECD countries the data availability on the composition of value 
added for most of the industries allows us to calculate an alternative measure of economic 
structures, where we control for the firm asset characteristics in the given industry. In this 
analysis, the primary data source is the OECD STAN database for industrial analysis, which 
enables retrieval of gross value added for 47 industries representing nine main sectors of the 
economy in 25 countries. We divide the industries using firm specific characteristics from either 
an asset-intensive or knowledge sector, where we measured asset intensity as the ratio of tangible 
assets (property, plant and equipment) to total book assets of the firm in the industry, whereas the 
company specific data was computed using data from the Bureau van Dijk's ORBIS database. 
According to our theory, asset-intensive firms with tangible assets may use the assets to 
collateralise their bank debt. Hence, in countries dominated by asset-intensive industries bank-
based financial systems are more likely to emerge. In contrast, knowledge-based companies with 
a low level of tangible assets are often forced to use either equity or bonds to finance their needs. 
Therefore, countries dominated by industries with intangible assets are more likely to have a 
market-based financial system. 
Classifying industries as either asset or tangible asset intensive, where we distinguish 
industries using ratios calculated on firm level data, we again construct two alternative measures 
for economic structure and employ them in the basic regression. The results of those regressions 
are similar to those we have presented previously and the coefficients of the economic structure 
were again negative and statistically significant. Overall the robustness tests at the industry-level 
also confirm our findings on the link between economic structure and financial structure. 
8. Conclusion 
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Our results provide new evidence concerning the causes and causality of the direction of 
evolution of the financial system structure. Using both OLS, dynamic panel techniques and event 
studies we document that the economic structure is closely linked to the shape of the financial 
system. We find that countries with asset-intensive sectors are more likely to have a bank-based 
system. Conversely, countries with sectors that are based on knowledge and intangible assets are 
likely to exhibit a market-based financial system. The results suggest that the structure of the real 
economy may influence the structure of the financial system. Additionally, even during systemic 
crises, such a relationship still holds. Moreover, we conduct event studies using a difference-in-
difference strategy in order to address the problems of potential endogeneity. We use different 
shocks that alter the economic structures in India, Finland and Sweden, and South Korea. In all 
the countries the shocks resulted in significant development of the service sector relative to the 
industry sector. The changes in economic structure were followed by changes in the structure of 
financial system, where the stock market gained on importance relative to the banking sector. 
Consequently, the results of the event studies suggest a causal relation between economic 
structure and financial structure. 
In our opinion, these results present a missing link in the explanation as to why country 
financial structures still differ. The results, however, confirm that other factors may influence the 
structure of the financial system. Consequently, a financial system may not always have an 
optimal structure, which may be a result of political arrangements or the interests of incumbent 
groups (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Therefore, we assume that financial systems may not always 
be able to reach their optimal structure. However, as existing barriers are removed the structure 
of a financial system may develop and gain ground, but it would be independent of further 
changes in the real economic structure. Finally, when the financial system has reached its 
 43 
 
optimal structure with respect to the characteristics of the real economy, our theory implies that 
any increase in the significance of fixed-asset-intensive sectors would lead to an increase in the 
role of banks with respect to the stock market. 
The main policy implications of the model are that despite efforts from governments and 
multilateral organisations, particular those from the emerging economies, country capital markets 
will not grow in size or activity as long as the economy remains asset-intensive. Therefore, 
governments should focus on improving the transparency or efficiency of the existing financial 
structure and less on the development of the stock market because the market will develop as 
soon as the economic structure changes. These results are consistent with Robinson (1952). 
Finally, this study contributes to the ongoing debate on the relative merits of bank-based 
versus market-based financial systems with respect to the promotion of economic growth. Our 
paper presents plausible explanations to Luintel et al. (2008), that financial structure matters with 
respect to economic growth. 
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Table 1 Employment by Industry in the US: 1910 vs. 2015  
This table compares the employment by industry in the US in the year of 1910 and 2015. The 
employment is shown in thousand persons and in the ratio to GDP (percent). a includes farmers, 
managers, laborers, and foremen. 
b for 2015 the “other” category includes leisure and hospitality (except 
for food services and drinking places), repair and maintenance, and membership associations and 
organizations. Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and U.S. Census Bureau. 
Industry 1910 2015 
Farm workers
a
  11,533 31.2% 1,073 0.8% 
Forestry and fisheries 250 0.7% 52 0.0% 
Mining 1,050 2.8% 768 0.5% 
Manufacturing 8,230 22.3% 12,317 8.6% 
Construction 2,300 6.2% 6,446 4.5% 
Transportation and public utilities 3,190 8.6% 5,404 3.8% 
Wholesale and retail trade 3,370 9.1% 32,561 22.8% 
Finance and real estate 520 1.4% 8,124 5.7% 
Educational services 900 2.4% 13,724 9.6% 
Other professional services 770 2.1% 41,012 28.7% 
Domestic service 2,150 5.8% —   
Personal service 1,520 4.1% 1,402 1.0% 
Government not elsewhere classified 540 1.5% 11,748 8.2% 
Other
b
 600 1.6% 8,306 5.8% 
TOTAL 36,923 100% 142,936 100% 
 
 
Table 2 Sector Weights in UK and US Equity Markets: 1899 vs. 2000 
This table compares the weights of sectors in the equity market of UK and US over the last century. The 
industry composition is based on the industrial classification that was in effect in 1990. Source: Dimson et 
al. (2002). 
Sectors 
United Kingdom United States 
1899 2000 1899 2000 
Railroads 49.2 0.3 62.8 0.2 
Banks and finance 15.4 16.8 6.7 12.9 
Mining 6.7 2 0 0 
Textiles 5 0 0.7 0.2 
Iron, coal, steel 4.5 0.1 5.2 0.3 
Breweries and distillers 3.9 2.1 0.3 0.4 
Utilities 3.1 3.6 4.8 3.8 
Telegraph and telephone 2.5 14 3.9 5.6 
Insurance 1.9 4.4 0 4.9 
Other transport 1.4 1.5 3.7 0.5 
Chemicals 1.3 0.9 0.5 1.2 
Food manufacturing 1 2 2.5 1.2 
Retailers 0.7 4.4 0.1 5.6 
Tabaco 0 1 4 0.8 
Sectors that were small in 1900 3.4 46.9 4.8 62.4 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
This table presents the summary statistics and correlations for the variables used in the paper. The data are averaged over the period 1972-2015. 
The definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix Table A.1.  
 Size Ac. Ef. Str. Aggr. ES1 ES2 H-S H-A H-S L_B L_F L_G L_R CR C_AD R_AD Cath. Mus. O_reg 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Mean -0.75 -2.62 0.25 0.02 0.02 0.45 0.65 -1.34 -3.46 -1.34 0.32 0.39 0.16 0.09 1.94 3.73 3.40 0.36 0.19 0.20 
Std. Dev. 1.03 1.91 3.02 1.03 1.04 0.13 0.38 1.19 1.36 1.19 0.47 0.49 0.37 0.28 1.06 0.94 1.11 0.48 0.40 0.40 
Min. -4.74 -8.41 -6.95 -3.67 -3.21 0.07 0.08 -3.85 -6.32 -3.85 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 
Max 2.51 1.14 5.15 2.88 2.01 0.81 4.02 0.19 -0.74 0.19 1 1 1 1 4 5 5 1 1 1 
Obs. 542 562 431 540 426 654 654 126 153 126 827 827 827 827 774 396 585 827 827 827 
Panel B: Correlations   
Size 1                    
Activity 0.65* 1                   
Efficiency 0.49* 0.89* 1                  
Structure 0.90* 0.90* 0.76* 1                 
Aggregate 0.78* 0.96* 0.91* 0.96* 1                
ES1  -0.05 -0.26* -0.42* -0.16* -0.27* 1               
ES2  -0.04 -0.07 -0.12* -0.04 -0.05 0.72* 1              
H-Size 0.47* 0.15 0.46* 0.33* 0.35* -0.31* -0.24* 1             
H-Activity 0.35* 0.34* 0.16 0.38* 0.27* -0.05 -0.01 0.74* 1            
H-Structure 0.55* 0.33* 0.29* 0.48* 0.39* -0.17 -0.13 0.94* 0.91* 1           
L_British 0.36* 0.12* 0.07 0.26* 0.17* 0.24* 0.02 0.57* 0.48* 0.59* 1          
L_French -0.08* -0.10* -0.10* -0.09* -0.10* -0.14* -0.02 -0.07 0.06 0.18* -0.54* 1         
L_German -0.25* 0.05 0.09* -0.11* -0.03 -0.14* 0.01 -0.32* -0.13 -0.36* -0.30* -0.36* 1        
L_Russia -0.13* -0.15* -0.27* -0.16* -0.23* 0.15* 0.08* - - - -0.20* -0.25* -0.13* 1       
CR 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.21 0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.46* 0.14 0.24* 0.25* -0.38* 0.17* 0.05 1      
C_ADR 0.20* 0.18* 0.40* 0.19* 0.39* 0.04 0.02 0.22* 0.01 -0.09 0.20* -0.31* 0.10* - 0.19* 1     
R_ADR 0.33* 0.34* 0.38* 0.37* 0.42* 0.11* 0.14* 0.52* 0.24* 0.42* 0.46* -0.42* -0.08* 0.09* 0.18* 0.71* 1    
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Catholic -0.15* -0.13* -0.12* -0.15* -0.16* -0.24* -0.19* -0.14 -0.07 -0.00 -0.36* 0.47* 0.10* -0.23* -0.11* -0.27* -0.41* 1   
Muslim 0.12* 0.06 0.02 0.08* 0.08 0.24* 0.20* - - - 0.02 0.16* -0.22* 0.04 0.03 0.12* -0.04 -0.37* 1  
Other_reg -0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.20* 0.17* -0.02 0.22* 0.06 0.04 -0.31* 0.15* 0.36* 0.11* 0.13* 0.32* -0.43* -0.28* 1 
Note: 
*
 indicates statistical significance at 5 percent level. 
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Table 4 Economic Structure and Financial Structure: Baseline Results 
This table reports the baseline results on financial structure and economic structure. The dependent variable is the five measures of financial 
structure respectively. The explanatory variables included in the regressions are two measures of economic structure (ES). In PANEL A, we use 
OLS with country fixed effects. In PANEL B, we use two-step system GMM.  ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level 
respectively; Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dep Var Size  Activity  Efficiency  Structure  Aggregate  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
PANEL A: OLS 
ES1 -3.574***  -5.552***  -5.042***  -3.430***  -0.991  
 (0.939)  (1.359)  (1.648)  (0.871)  (0.769)  
ES2  -0.718*  -1.510***  -1.022*  -0.800**  -0.146 
  (0.404)  (0.522)  (0.583)  (0.358)  (0.274) 
Cons 0.706* -0.338 -0.481 -1.883*** 2.082*** 0.656** 1.374*** 0.438** 0.367 0.0535 
 (0.382) (0.230) (0.555) (0.300) (0.651) (0.320) (0.353) (0.204) (0.306) (0.152) 
Country 
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs. 561 561 572 572 483 482 555 555 467 467 
Ct num 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
R
2
 0.065 0.020 0.065 0.032 0.047 0.014 0.070 0.028 0.008 0.001 
PANEL B: two-step system GMM 
ES1 -3.871***  -10.59***  -12.24***  -4.502***  -1.632  
 (1.228)  (2.016)  (3.804)  (1.167)  (1.067)  
ES2  -0.853**  -2.724***  -1.337**  -1.206***  -0.367 
  (0.374)  (0.604)  (0.600)  (0.356)  (0.224) 
cons 0.215 -1.038*** 0.798 -2.486*** 4.488*** - 1.272* -0.182 0.434 -0.0900 
 (0.721) (0.386) (1.194) (0.638) (1.391) - (0.670) (0.327) (0.476) (0.174) 
Obs. 561 561 572 572 483 482 555 555 467 467 
Ct num 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
Hansen J 0.129 0.448 0.167 0.154 0.215 0.353 0.128 0.395 0.026 0.067 
AR(2) 0.012 0.009 0.024 0.011 0.030 0.064 0.012 0.005 0.019 0.013 
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Table 5  Economic Structure and Financial Structure: Controlling for Other Factors 
This table reports the results of the regressions when controlling for more factors. The dependent variable is Structure, defined as the principal 
component of Size and Activity. The explanatory variables included in the regressions are two measures of economic structure (ES), dummies for 
legal origin of the country (British, German, French, and Russia), creditor rights, revised or corrected anti-director rights, historical index for 
financial structure as well as dummies for the religion of the country (Catholic, Muslim, and other religions rather than Catholic, Muslim and 
Protestant). Note that the dummy of Scandinavian as legal origin as well as the dummy of Protestant as religion are captured as constant in the 
regressions. We do not include the country fixed effects in the regressions in order to report the coefficients for time-invariant variables. We run 
the regressions using all the five measures of financial structure respectively as the dependent variable but we only report the results using 
Structure. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively; Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dep Var. Structure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
ES1 -2.952***  -2.916***  -3.970***  -3.884***  -6.623***  -3.176***  
 (0.663)  (0.691)  (0.889)  (0.788)  (1.432)  (0.707)  
ES2  -0.505*  -0.490*  -1.089**  -1.079***  -2.170***  -0.581** 
  (0.267)  (0.265)  (0.444)  (0.418)  (0.639)  (0.264) 
English 0.667*** 0.565*** 0.419** 0.178         
 (0.175) (0.183) (0.198) (0.193)         
French   -0.169 -0.310         
   (0.223) (0.212)         
German   -0.393 -0.464*         
   (0.249) (0.240)         
Russian   -0.449 -0.801**         
   (0.346) (0.336)         
CR     -0.0415 -0.0255 -0.136 -0.106     
     (0.0998) (0.0980) (0.0848) (0.0772)     
C-ADR     0.307* 0.279*       
     (0.160) (0.167)       
R-ADR       0.394*** 0.388***     
       (0.106) (0.106)     
HStructure         0.244 0.307*   
         (0.174) (0.171)   
Catholic           -0.510** -0.492** 
           (0.244) (0.246) 
Muslim           0.304 0.104 
           (0.281) (0.258) 
Other_relig           -0.0983 -0.235 
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           (0.267) (0.269) 
Cons 1.009*** 0.0909 1.240*** 0.469** 0.812 -0.0396 0.586 -0.391 2.660*** 1.536*** 1.462*** 0.529** 
 (0.300) (0.198) (0.287) (0.191) (0.686) (0.673) (0.475) (0.435) (0.388) (0.249) (0.321) (0.221) 
Country FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Obs. 497 497 497 497 281 281 388 388 96 96 497 497 
Ct num 93 93 93 93 44 44 65 65 14 14 93 93 
R
2
 0.097 0.046 0.109 0.067 0.088 0.074 0.189 0.168 0.395 0.374 0.075 0.026 
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Table 6  Economic Structure and Financial Structure: Heterogenous Effects 
This table reports the results of the regressions using subsamples of different countries. The dependent variable is Structure, defined as the 
principal component of Size and Activity. The explanatory variables included in the regressions are two measures of economic structure (ES) as 
well as dummies for legal origin of the country (British, German, French, and Russia). The dummy of Scandinavian as legal origin is captured as 
constant in the regressions. We do not include the country fixed effects in the regressions in order to report the coefficients for time-invariant 
variables. We run the regressions using all the five measures of financial structure respectively as the dependent variable but we only report the 
results using Structure. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively; Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
Dep Var. Structure 
Less developed legal system More developed legal system Low government 
effectiveness 
High government 
effectiveness 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ES1 
-2.279  -3.295***  -1.378  -3.442***  
 (1.450)  (0.796)  (1.097)  (0.954)  
ES2  -0.0703  -1.020***  0.00371  -0.887* 
  (0.385)  (0.359)  (0.330)  (0.461) 
English 1.056*** 0.928*** 0.396* 0.217 0.653* 0.612 0.469** 0.379* 
 (0.354) (0.306) (0.218) (0.231) (0.371) (0.398) (0.230) (0.221) 
French 0.430 0.449 -0.193 -0.269 0.0434 0.0908 -0.0305 -0.0735 
 (0.387) (0.355) (0.234) (0.238) (0.420) (0.428) (0.274) (0.265) 
German -0.173 0.0218 0.0835 0.0541 - - -0.374 -0.439* 
 (0.403) (0.329) (0.329) (0.317) - - (0.256) (0.247) 
Russian - - -0.311 -0.636 - - -1.264*** -1.503*** 
 - - (0.479) (0.489) - - (0.151) (0.143) 
Cons. 0.376 -0.635* 1.372*** 0.730*** 0.126 -0.580 1.423*** 0.664** 
 (0.758) (0.324) (0.324) (0.234) (0.724) (0.452) (0.372) (0.272) 
Chi-sq(ES)   -1.015 -0.950*   -2.064 -0.891* 
(P-value)   (0.229) (0.071)   (0.142) (0.099) 
Country FE      NO     NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Obs.  206 206 291 291 150 150 342 342 
Ct num. 40      40 53 53 33 33 59 59 
R
2
     0.056    0.088 0.195 0.105 0.055 0.045 0.097 0.075 
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Table 7  Economic Structure and Financial Structure: the Impact of Crisis 
This table reports the results of the regressions using subsamples during normal periods and crises. The 
dependent variable is Structure, defined as the principal component of Size and Activity. The explanatory 
variables included in the regressions are two measures of economic structure (ES) as well as dummies for 
legal origin of the country (British, German, French, and Russia). The dummy of Scandinavian as legal 
origin is captured as constant in the regressions. We do not include the country fixed effects in the 
regressions in order to report the coefficients for time-invariant variables. We run the regressions using all 
the five measures of financial structure respectively as the dependent variable but we only report the 
results using Structure. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively; 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dep Var. Structure 
Normal periods Crisis periods 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ES1 -1.867***  -5.047***  
 (0.691)  (1.180)  
ES2  -0.0956  -1.333*** 
  (0.258)  (0.501) 
English 0.265 0.0944 0.820** 0.477* 
 (0.239) (0.238) (0.320) (0.264) 
French -0.274 -0.383 -0.0355 -0.238 
 (0.259) (0.253) (0.260) (0.288) 
German -0.355 -0.402 -0.496* -0.622** 
 (0.274) (0.267) (0.283) (0.317) 
Russian -0.752** -1.003*** 0.859** 0.329 
 (0.353) (0.344) (0.395) (0.462) 
Cons. 0.946*** 0.340 1.786*** 0.713*** 
 (0.319) (0.238) (0.416) (0.268) 
Chi-sq (ES)   -3.179*** -1.237** 
(P-value)   (0.009) (0.023) 
Country FE NO NO NO NO 
Obs. 414 414 83 83 
Ct num. 93 93 57 57 
R
2
 0.111 0.086 0.233 0.137 
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Table 8  Event Studies 
Panel A  The Impact of Structural Reforms on Financial Structure in India 
This table reports the results of the regressions examining the impact of the structural reforms in early 
1990s. The dependent variable is Size.  Shock_India is defined as one from 1993 to 2015, after the launch 
of reform measures, or zero before 1990. We drop the years of 1991 and 1992 from the analysis because 
of the financial crisis and corresponding structural reforms in this period. Treated-India is defined as one 
for India, and zero for other Asian countries excluding Singapore, Japan, India, South Korea and Hong 
Kong. We do not include the country fixed effects in the regressions in order to report the coefficients for 
the time-invariant variables. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively; 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dep. Var Size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Shock_India 0.176 0.183 0.212 0.183 
 (0.245) (0.247) (0.267) (0.249) 
Treated_India*Shock_India 2.015*** 1.997*** 1.915*** 1.998*** 
 (0.264) (0.266) (0.280) (0.268) 
Treated_India -1.120*** -1.796*** -1.557*** -0.843 
 (0.356) (0.408) (0.517) (0.571) 
Commonl  1.092**   
  (0.538)   
CR   -0.102  
   (0.185)  
R-ADR   0.160  
   (0.468)  
Catholic    0.660** 
    (0.313) 
Muslim    0.239 
    (0.347) 
Other_relig    -0.559 
    (0.607) 
GDPgrowth 0.0139 0.0174 0.0376*** 0.0173 
 (0.0146) (0.0143) (0.00932) (0.0145) 
Cons. -0.807** -1.237*** -1.066 -0.539* 
 (0.357) (0.357) (2.031) (0.310) 
country FE  NO NO NO NO 
Year FE NO NO NO NO 
N 323 323 259 323 
Ct num 12 12 8 12 
R
2
 0.384 0.404 0.525 0.404 
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Panel B  The Collapse of the Soviet Union and Its Impact on Financial Structure in Finland and Sweden 
This table reports the results of the regressions examining the impact of the collapse of Soviet Union as an 
exogenous shock on the financial structure. The dependent variable is Structure.  Shock_SU is defined as 
one from 1993 to 2002, after the collapse, or zero from 1979 to 1988, before the collapse. We drop the 
years between 1989 and 1992 from our analysis, in order to avoid noise. Treated_SU is defined as one for 
Finland and Sweden, and zero for other OECD countries excluding Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, 
Norway and Denmark). We do not include the country fixed effects in the regressions in order to report 
the coefficients for time-invariant variables. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level respectively; Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dep var. Structure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Shock_SU 0.811*** 0.795*** 0.820*** 0.790*** 
 (0.164) (0.169) (0.182) (0.171) 
Treated_SU*Shock_SU 0.900*** 0.916*** 0.889*** 0.920*** 
 (0.186) (0.191) (0.202) (0.192) 
Treated_SU -0.258 -0.124 -0.385* -0.555* 
 (0.206) (0.215) (0.226) (0.297) 
Commonl  0.666***   
  (0.195)   
CR   -0.0764  
   (0.119)  
R-ADR   0.168  
   (0.127)  
Catholic    -0.400 
    (0.298) 
Muslim    0.682*** 
    (0.240) 
Other_relig    -0.285 
    (0.332) 
GDP growth 0.0443* 0.0439* 0.0473* 0.0459* 
 (0.0234) (0.0257) (0.0283) (0.0262) 
Cons. -0.655*** -0.788*** -1.049** -0.363 
 (0.215) (0.224) (0.457) (0.302) 
Country FE NO NO NO NO 
Year FE NO NO NO NO 
Obs. 426 426 400 426 
Ct num. 32 32 31 32 
R
2
 0.393 0.389 0.395 0.389 
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Panel C The Impact of Economic Reforms on Financial Structure in South Korea 
This table reports the results of the regressions examining the impact of the economic reforms in late 
1980s and early 1990s. The dependent variable is Size.  Shock_Korea is defined as one from 1995 to 2015, 
after the launch of reform measures, or zero before 1984. Treated_Korea is defined as one for South 
Korea, and zero for other Asian countries excluding Singapore, Japan, India, South Korea and Hong 
Kong. We drop the years between 1985 and 1994 from our analysis due the policy changes during this 
period. We do not include the country fixed effects in the regressions in order to report the coefficients for 
time-invariant variables. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively; 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Dep. Var Size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Shock_Korea 0.367 0.371 0.478 0.371 
 (0.263) (0.264) (0.418) (0.266) 
Treated_Korea*Shock_Korea 1.087*** 1.093*** 1.169*** 1.093*** 
 (0.275) (0.278) (0.391) (0.280) 
Treated_Korea -0.977** -0.619 -1.334** -0.709 
 (0.460) (0.482) (0.535) (0.600) 
Commonl  0.981*   
  (0.570)   
CR   -0.171  
   (0.208)  
R-ADR   0.183  
   (0.532)  
Catholic    0.815** 
    (0.403) 
Muslim    0.568 
    (0.420) 
Other_relig    -0.390 
    (0.661) 
GDPgrowth 0.0196 0.0218 0.0587*** 0.0217 
 (0.0152) (0.0157) (0.0144) (0.0159) 
Cons. -1.020** -1.399*** -1.346 -0.917 
 (0.418) (0.402) (2.154) (0.580) 
country FE  NO NO NO NO 
Year FE NO NO NO NO 
N 264 264 202 264 
Ct num 12 12 8 12 
R
2
 0.498 0.520 0.704 0.520 
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Figure 1 Change of Economic Structure and Financial Structure in India 
Note: This figure plots the change of economic structure (the variable ES2) and financial structure (the 
variable Size) from 1960 to 2015 in India. Due to data limitation of value traded in the stock market, we 
use the variable Size instead of Structure to measure finance structure. To smooth the volatile yearly 
change for economic growth and stock market performance, we use the local polynomial smooth plots. 
Data source: World Bank, Bombay Stock Exchange. 
 
Figure 2 Change of Financial Structure: the Impact of the Structural Reforms in India in early 1990s 
Note: This figure plots the yearly change of financial structure (the variable Size) for India and the mean 
of Size for the control countries from 1960 to 2015. The treated country is India and the control group 
includes other Asian countries except Japan, India, Korea, Rep., Singapore and Hong Kong. Data source: 
World Bank, Bombay Stock Exchange. 
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Figure 3 Change of Economic Structure and Financial Structure in Finland and Sweden 
Note: This figure plots the change of economic structure (the variable ES2) and financial structure (the 
variable Structure) from 1974 to 2015 in Finland and Sweden. To smooth the volatile yearly change for 
economic growth and stock market performance, we use the local polynomial smooth plots. Data source: 
World Bank.  
 
Figure 4 Change of Financial Structure: the Impact of the Collapse of the Soviet Union 
Note: This figure plots the yearly change of the mean value of financial structure (the variable Structure) 
between 1975 and 2015. The treated group includes Finland and Sweden, and the control group includes 
other OECD countries excluding Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark). Data source: 
World Bank. 
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Figure 5 Change of Economic Structure and Financial Structure in South Korea 
Note: This figure plots the change of economic structure (the variable ES2) and financial structure (the 
variable Size) from 1960 to 2015 in South Korea. Due to data limitation of value traded in the stock 
market, again we use the variable Size instead of Structure. To smooth the volatile yearly change for 
economic growth and stock market performance, we use the local polynomial smooth plots. Data source: 
World Bank, Korean Stock Exchange. 
 
Figure 6 Change of Financial Structure: the Impact of the Economic Reforms in South Korea in late 
1980s and 1990s 
Note: This figure plots the yearly change of financial structure (the variable Size) for South Korea and the 
mean of Size for the control countries from 1960 to 2015. The treated country is South Korea, and the 
control group includes other Asian countries except Japan, India, Korea, Rep., Singapore and Hong Kong. 
Data source: World Bank, Korean Stock Exchange. 
  
-3
-2
-1
0
S
iz
e
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
E
S
2
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
6
YEAR
ES2: Korea, Rep. Size: Korea, Rep.
-3
-2
-1
0
1
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
6
YEAR
Size: Korea, Rep. Size: Control group
 65 
 
Appendix 
Table A.1 Definitions of main variables and data sources 
Financial development 
Private credit Equals the amount of private credit by 
money banks and other financial 
institutions divided by GDP 
 
 
 
Beck et al. (2001, 2010); 
Cihak, M. et al. (2012) 
Stock market capitalization Equals stock market capitalization divided 
by GDP 
Stock market value traded Equals stock market total value traded 
divided by GDP 
Financial structure 
Size Equals the log of the ratio of stock market 
capitalization to private credit 
 
 
 
 
Beck et al. (2001, 2010); 
Cihak, M. et al. (2012) 
Activity Equals the log of the ratio of value traded 
to private credit 
Efficiency Equals the ratio of total value trade to 
banking overhead costs 
Structure Equals the principal component of the two 
variables of Size and Activity 
Aggregate Equals the principal component of the 
three variables of Size, Activity and 
Efficiency 
Economic structure 
ES1 Equals the ratio of the value added of 
agriculture and industry to total gross 
value added 
World development indicators, 
the World bank 
ES2 Equals the ratio of the value added of 
industry to service sector 
World development indicators, 
the World bank 
Law and governance factors 
Legal origin Indices created by coding countries by 
legal origin, which can be divided into 
five categories-English Common Law, 
French Civil Law, German Civil Law, 
Scandinavian Civil Law and Russian Civil 
Law 
LLSV (1997, 1998) 
Creditor rights Indices aggregating creditor rights, which 
range from 0 (weakest creditor rights) to 4 
(strongest creditor rights) 
Djankov et al. (2007) 
Corrected ADR Corrected indices of the original anti-
director rights index, with improved data 
collection, coding and documentation 
Spamann (2010) 
Revised ADR Revised index of the original anti-director 
rights index, which aggregates shareholder 
protection in over 100 articles, including 
shareholder voting and minority 
protection 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
Debt contract enforcement The number of days to resolve a payment 
dispute through courts. 
Djankov et al. (2007) 
Government effectiveness The index captures perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) 
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civil service etc., and the creditability of 
the government’s commitment to such 
policies.  
Culture 
Religion Indices created by coding countries based 
on religion, which can be divided into 
three categories, Catholic, Muslim and 
Other religions.  
Djankov et al. (2007) 
Banking crises   
Systemic banking crises Represents a banking crisis when a 
country's corporate and financial sectors 
experience numerous defaults. 
Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
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Table A.2 Country-averages of the main regression variables 
Country Size Activity Efficiency Structure Aggregate ES1 ES2 Law 
Argentina -0.90 -2.55 -1.02 -0.05 0.15 0.43 0.65 F 
Armenia -2.85 -6.93 -5.81 -2.42 -2.42 0.64 1.15 R 
Australia 0.01 -1.26 3.70 0.89 1.08 0.31 0.41 B 
Austria -2.00 -3.67 1.41 -0.99 -0.11 0.36 0.52 G 
Bahrain 0.20 -3.17 1.08 0.37 0.27 0.48 0.93 - 
Bangladesh -1.35 -3.93 -1.25 -0.71 -0.66 0.52 0.45 B 
Barbados -0.17 -3.68 -1.15 0.02 -0.12 0.19 0.21 B 
Belgium -0.30 -2.09 2.69 0.41 0.73 0.27 0.35 F 
Bolivia -1.73 -6.82 -4.69 -1.77 -1.89 0.51 0.69 F 
Botswana 0.07 -3.12 -1.58 0.32 -0.05 0.55 1.12 B 
Brazil -0.63 -1.84 1.32 0.46 0.60 0.42 0.64 F 
Bulgaria -2.28 -4.44 -2.36 -1.37 -1.26 0.51 1.04 F 
Canada -0.09 -1.56 3.49 0.68 1.00 0.31 0.42 B 
Chile 0.17 -2.38 1.31 0.70 0.56 0.46 0.73 F 
China -1.37 -1.01 3.70 0.13 0.56 0.65 1.39 G 
Colombia -0.50 -3.03 -0.79 0.13 0.04 0.48 0.64 F 
Costa Rica -1.50 -4.97 -3.43 -1.10 -1.26 0.39 0.47 F 
Croatia -0.77 -3.61 -1.03 -0.29 -0.42 0.35 0.44 G 
Cyprus -1.73 -3.81 0.28 -0.88 -0.59 0.30 0.35 - 
Czech Republic -1.06 -1.87 1.27 0.05 0.16 0.41 0.64 F 
Cote d'Ivoire -0.69 -4.29 -2.50 -0.45 -0.30 0.54 0.66 F 
Denmark -0.71 -2.53 3.11 0.06 0.71 0.29 0.37 R 
Ecuador -1.26 -4.77 -3.51 -0.91 -1.15 0.47 0.57 F 
Egypt, Arab Rep. -0.54 -2.21 1.56 0.24 0.47 0.51 0.67 F 
El Salvador -1.04 -5.26 -2.85 -0.93 -1.09 0.42 0.50 G 
Estonia -1.19 -2.82 0.43 -0.30 -0.19 0.33 0.44 G 
Fiji -1.74 -5.86 -4.10 -1.35 -1.60 0.40 0.36 B 
Finland -0.42 -1.35 4.02 0.56 1.15 0.39 0.57 R 
France -0.98 -1.90 3.59 0.09 0.93 0.29 0.36 F 
Georgia -1.44 -5.40 -4.64 -1.19 -1.50 0.52 0.65 R 
Germany -1.35 -1.73 3.30 -0.07 0.68 0.33 0.48 G 
Ghana -0.22 -3.37 -3.01 0.08 -0.46 0.65 0.64 B 
Greece -0.76 -2.51 1.78 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.26 F 
Guatemala -3.04 -6.34 -5.15 -2.35 -2.28 0.41 0.48 F 
Guyana -0.94 -6.52 -4.02 -1.31 -1.52 0.57 0.71 B 
Hong Kong, China 0.36 -0.16 4.66 1.34 1.51 0.09 0.10 B 
Hungary -1.00 -1.66 0.84 0.15 0.16 0.36 0.49 G 
Iceland -1.19 -2.60 1.16 -0.23 -0.05 0.33 0.38 R 
India 0.13 -0.76 2.21 1.04 0.99 0.59 0.75 B 
Indonesia -0.51 -1.60 1.17 0.44 0.58 0.59 1.07 F 
Ireland -0.67 -2.36 2.72 0.12 0.38 0.35 0.51 B 
Italy -0.97 -2.16 2.71 0.31 0.61 0.30 0.39 F 
Jamaica 0.55 -2.52 -1.43 0.76 0.27 0.33 0.41 B 
Japan -1.03 -1.41 4.13 0.20 0.74 0.36 0.55 G 
Jordan 0.15 -1.44 2.01 0.85 0.79 0.32 0.40 F 
Kazakhstan -0.64 -3.64 -1.82 -0.23 -0.49 0.47 0.73 R 
Kenya -0.41 -3.57 -1.68 -0.08 -0.27 0.50 0.39 B 
  
 68 
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Korea, Rep. -0.84 -0.71 3.93 0.52 1.10 0.46 0.69 G 
Kuwait 0.16 -1.02 3.24 0.98 1.10 0.64 1.83 F 
Kyrgyz Republic -1.82 -2.65 -2.51 -0.60 -0.76 0.59 0.74 R 
Latvia -1.86 -4.80 -2.50 -1.25 -1.22 0.31 0.38 G 
Lebanon -1.35 -4.08 -0.50 -0.76 -0.63 0.27 0.29 F 
Lithuania -0.76 -3.17 -1.24 -0.16 -0.35 0.37 0.49 F 
Luxembourg -0.17 -4.60 0.37 -0.08 -0.03 0.17 0.20 F 
Macedonia -2.08 -4.24 -2.36 -1.21 -1.16 0.42 0.52 F 
Malawi 0.24 -3.14 -3.12 0.41 -0.27 0.59 0.54 B 
Malaysia 0.16 -1.40 3.47 0.87 1.04 0.57 0.95 B 
Malta -1.39 -4.86 -0.42 -1.00 -0.80 0.45 1.02 F 
Mauritius -0.57 -3.69 -0.01 -0.21 -0.14 0.40 0.47 - 
Mexico -0.93 -1.35 0.58 0.48 0.66 0.40 0.56 F 
Moldova -1.01 -2.81 -1.39 -0.17 -0.15 0.43 0.44 R 
Mongolia -1.45 -4.10 -2.32 -0.81 -0.93 0.52 0.68 G 
Montenegro 0.42 -2.66 -0.24 0.65 0.27 0.32 0.31 - 
Morocco -0.55 -2.64 1.02 0.11 0.28 0.45 0.56 F 
Namibia -2.60 -5.19 -2.96 -1.78 -1.62 0.42 0.59 B 
Nepal -0.97 -4.30 -1.60 -0.61 -0.68 0.64 0.45 B 
Netherlands -0.53 -1.26 4.31 0.53 1.10 0.31 0.41 F 
New Zealand -0.64 -2.47 1.58 0.11 0.06 0.37 0.45 B 
Nigeria -0.06 -3.25 -2.01 0.21 -0.09 0.69 1.36 B 
Norway -1.14 -2.24 2.93 -0.10 0.60 0.39 0.61 R 
Oman -0.15 -1.88 0.91 0.56 0.40 0.70 2.41 F 
Pakistan -0.34 -1.56 1.31 0.54 0.60 0.50 0.47 B 
Panama -1.23 -5.24 -1.60 -1.03 -0.98 0.30 0.34 F 
Papua New Guinea 1.48 -5.20 -3.35 0.91 0.05 0.68 1.10 B 
Paraguay -2.35 -5.52 -4.38 -1.73 -1.78 0.53 0.73 F 
Peru 0.02 -2.21 -0.49 0.55 0.32 0.44 0.62 F 
Philippines 0.33 -1.50 1.24 1.05 0.77 0.54 0.77 F 
Poland -0.79 -2.27 0.66 0.27 0.21 0.37 0.54 F 
Portugal -1.27 -2.12 2.32 -0.14 0.21 0.29 0.36 F 
Romania -1.57 -4.03 -2.79 -0.86 -1.00 0.58 1.22 F 
Russian Federation -0.11 -1.27 -0.06 0.76 0.41 0.46 0.76 R 
Saudi Arabia -0.01 -0.67 2.99 0.99 0.98 0.60 1.55 B 
Serbia -0.55 -3.61 -2.15 -0.05 -0.39 0.46 0.59 F 
Singapore 0.44 -0.56 4.65 1.27 1.50 0.33 0.50 B 
Slovak Republic -2.19 -4.36 -1.26 -1.31 -1.07 0.40 0.60 F 
Slovenia -1.27 -3.08 -0.36 -0.41 -0.38 0.37 0.54 F 
South Africa 0.30 -2.02 2.56 0.77 0.91 0.41 0.63 B 
Spain -0.58 -2.01 3.62 0.28 0.99 0.32 0.42 F 
Sri Lanka -0.37 -2.60 -0.42 0.23 0.01 0.49 0.56 B 
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.08 -4.50 -1.14 -0.15 -0.40 0.29 0.36 B 
Swaziland -0.89 -4.54 -4.46 -0.45 -1.14 0.55 0.86 B 
Sweden -0.96 -1.98 3.91 0.08 1.09 0.33 0.46 R 
Switzerland -0.23 -0.28 4.06 0.98 1.23 0.29 0.40 G 
Tanzania -0.77 -4.72 -4.35 -0.62 -1.10 0.57 0.47 B 
Thailand -0.75 -1.64 2.85 0.44 0.64 0.49 0.68 B 
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Trinidad and Tobago -0.04 -3.38 -0.88 0.18 -0.01 0.51 1.03 B 
Tunisia -1.72 -4.11 -0.42 -0.97 -0.65 0.46 0.59 F 
Turkey -0.21 -0.26 2.09 0.99 0.99 0.47 0.56 F 
Uganda -0.73 -5.64 -5.39 -0.87 -1.41 0.61 0.39 B 
Ukraine -0.95 -4.11 -2.50 -0.54 -0.78 0.51 0.86 R 
United Kingdom -0.08 -0.85 4.07 0.90 1.08 0.25 0.33 B 
United States -0.51 -0.83 3.88 0.66 1.11 0.23 0.28 B 
Uruguay -3.52 -7.67 -6.52 -3.01 -2.89 0.39 0.49 F 
Venezuela, RB -1.20 -4.27 -3.92 -0.73 -1.14 0.54 1.10 F 
Vietnam -2.31 -3.46 0.49 -1.11 -0.69 0.58 0.87 F 
West Bank and Gaza -0.10 -1.98 0.02 0.55 0.27 0.35 0.41 - 
Zambia 0.26 -4.79 -4.47 -0.07 -0.72 0.55 1.00 B 
Zimbabwe 0.96 -1.19 0.75 1.37 1.21 0.46 0.56 B 
 
 
